By Hamza Al Muhaisen
The preceding decades have seen the gradual rise of the United Arab Emirates from a regional backwater to one of the preeminent Arab powers. Formerly another oil-producing Sheikhdom, the UAE is now synonymous with cosmopolitanism, luxury, and cutting-edge innovation. Yet behind the veneer of utopianism stands a ruthlessly pragmatic regional strategy predicated on military and diplomatic clout.
With military might forming the backbone of any geo-strategic ambitions, the Emirati leadership saw the buildup and reform of the Armed Forces as essential. One of the main challenges encountered by the UAE was the question of recruitment, as out of 1.15 million citizens, around 360,000 are eligible for service. The introduction of conscription in 2014 failed to alleviate this issue, for only 8% of recruits remained following the 12 month period of mandatory service- mainly as a result of the lack of economic incentives in continued participation. The soldiers who remain often do so because of family or tribal involvement in the Armed Forces- factors which could assist in rapid promotion, yet taint the integrity of the officer corps. Normally such fundamental issues would disqualify a state from seeking great-power status. Yet the virtually limitless financial resources of the UAE have allowed it to circumvent its manpower problem while mitigating the structural issues of its military.
Firstly, the UAE has turned to contract soldiers as a means of solving its issue with manpower. Tens of thousands of foreign soldiers have been contracted and deployed by the UAE in its various theaters of operations. Although these mercenaries have been drawn from a variety of different countries, particular attention has been given to the Sudanese and Colombian contractors. Soldiers of these nationalities have participated extensively in the Yemeni Civil War, from serving as guards to undertaking high-value missions. Utilizing foreign soldiers is useful since their deployment carries no domestic political risk in the event of casualties. Therefore, some of the more inexpensive contractors are often used liberally in frontline capacities. Additionally, handsome pay provides a massive incentive for experienced soldiers to enter into Emirati service- as in the case of Colombia, prospective contractors can expect a salary six times that of their military.
Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi has taken to employing former Western officers as a means of curbing tribal influence. A former Major General of the Australian military commands the Presidential Guard, while an American ex-colonel currently leads the Emirati Aviation Command. Lower down the chain of command, it is estimated that around 1,000 American officers serve the Emirati Military in various different capacities. These reforms, in addition to the Western armaments procured by the UAE have transformed its military into a highly potent force, leading to the state to be dubbed ‘little Sparta’ by some.
Major General Mike Hindmarsh (left) is an Australian national who served with his country’s Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, he was appointed Commander of the Emirati Presidential Guard.
Now boasting one of the premier fighting forces in the world, the UAE proceeded to take a highly dynamic and aggressive stance in its foreign affairs. At the tip of the spear of Arab counter-revolution, Abu Dhabi sought to roll back the perceived gains of revisionist movements across the region- from Sunni Islamists to Iranian backed groups. It used its strong financial advantage to back military coups in Egypt and Sudan (2013 and 2021 respectively). Later on, the Emiratis began bankrolling militias and putting boots on the ground in Libya and Yemen, while also constructing a military base in Eritrea. The results of these initiatives have proven to be mixed. Emirati efforts have been undeniably successful in Egypt and Sudan, as both saw the arrivals of military juntas which rapidly liquidated the Islamist movements in each country.
But Libya proved to be disappointing, and Yemen even more so. Despite the presence of thousands of contractors, along with an influx of arms, Abu Dhabi’s allies have failed to wrest Tripoli from the Government of National Accord, thanks in part to the intervention of Turkey. While in Yemen, the UAE has faced direct blowback for its opposition to the Houthis, losing 108 servicemen (not to mention thousands of contractors), while also falling prey to a drone attack deep into its territory. Facing such difficulties, the UAE even removed parts of its Eritrean base as part of an effort to downsize its involvement in the conflict.
Unable to directly dislodge its enemies through force, the UAE has notably softened its approach as of late. This has taken the form of a diverse portfolio of strategic partnerships and diplomatic initiatives. It balances close relations amongst the Great Powers while undertaking rapprochements with rivals like Turkey and Iran. Indeed, courting Bashar Al-Assad while simultaneously deepening relations with Israel reveals a current of hard realism emanating from Abu Dhabi. What can mainly be understood is that the United Arab Emirates possesses the resources and outsized ambitions of a rising power, and shall certainly continue to be a force to be reckoned with in the region.
