By Emin Khalladi Noka
The US invasion of Iraq began on March the 20th of 2003. The event had global ramifications and would lead to a huge change in Iraq’s atmosphere that continues to ripple to this day. The 18th anniversary of that event is today, and still millions of Iraqis continue to be affected by this tragic occurrence. For the first time since 2008, Turkey has recently launched a military operation in Northern Iraq to counter PKK elements that are considered a threat to Turkish sovereignty. This recent intervention has sparked a lot of new questions and theories, in a similar fashion to Turkey’s military offensive in Northern Syria last year. With this in mind, it’s a suitable time to discuss Iraq’s political future in light of recent events and impactful events to come.
A Summary of the Situation
As it stands right now, the central Iraqi government in Baghdad has control over the majority of the Iraqi landmass, yet remains at war with Kurdish separatist militias and the remains of the now miniscule Islamic State. Anti-government protests are one of the Iraqi government’s biggest current obstacles and have been raging continuously since October of 2019. Turkey began a new operation against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Northern Iraq on February 10th titled “Operation Claw-Eagle 2”, which is a segment of a broader umbrella term for a swathe of offensive military action conducted by Turkey since May 2019 called “Operation Claw”. Meanwhile, Iran’s political influence remains strong despite their top general Qasem Soleimani being assassinated in Baghdad by the United States Government under the Trump Administration in January 2020. The United States Military continues to be active in Iraq even under a new presidential administration (and still despite a unanimous Iraqi parliamentary vote to expel foreign troops from the country). Recent rocket attacks on the US army base in Ain al-Asad have prompted the US secretary of defense Lloyd Austin to promise a swift retaliation as they continue to gather intelligence about the situation. ISIS continues to be relevant in Northern Iraq despite being severely diminished, with a recent brutal attack in the Salah al-Din province leaving the country mourning the death of 8 civilians (including 6 family members). All in all, there are four main players to consider when analyzing Iraq’s political future. These would be: Turkey, the United States, Iran, and ISIS. Each factor shall be discussed in this article.
Turkey
When it comes to Middle Eastern international politics, many relationships are talked about in this whole complex scheme, but one crucial relationship that seems to be ignored in the Middle East’s epicentre is the relationship between Turkey and Iraq. Having been partially under Ottoman rule between 1535 and 1918, Turkey and Iraq share a great deal of cultural and historical ties. Furthermore, the source of Iraq’s famous rivers of ancient history (the Tigris and the Euphrates) are both found in the borders of modern day Turkey, which makes Iraq reliant on Turkey in this sense. Perhaps the most relevant and biggest modern connection between Iraq and Turkey that is pertinent to this article would be the presence of the Kurdish peoples, who all live in proximity to each other despite the Turkish-Iraqi border separating them. Amongst these Kurdish peoples is a strong sentiment of cultural unity and desire to form an independent Kurdish state. Thus, Kurdish separatist/nationalist militias have been a reoccurring key player in all conflicts in the Middle East. Out of the four countries where Kurdish separatism is present, Turkey is by far the biggest opponent of the Kurdish cause, having waged a costly war with Kurdish militias since 1978 on multiple different fronts. This is because Turkey is home to the largest Kurdish population out of any country, has the best military capabilities to secure its borders and sovereignty and has both a strong nationalist and interventionist sentiment that tend to go hand in hand in influencing Turkish military activity in the Middle East. There is more nuance to this topic, but that would be better left explored for another time – the issue at hand is more about Turkey’s interaction with Kurds in Northern Iraq.
Turkey’s military activity in Iraq is often spontaneous with large gaps of time in between their major operations (even though they have continuously fought against Kurdish separatism on other fronts). Their largest period of interference happened in the 1990s, during Saddam Hussein’s rule over Iraq – it was in collaboration with local Iraqi Kurdish forces and involved fighting mostly PKK elements. A large period of time passed between Turkey’s last operation in the 90s (Operation Dawn) and the next operation they would launch, which was in 2008 (Operation Sun). The gap likely had to do with the evolving political and economic situation in Turkey in the 2000s and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, although there are definitely more factors at play. During this operation, dynamics had changed: the local Iraqi Kurdish authority was strongly opposed to Turkey’s operation against the PKK instead of working with them and the international community had a lot of criticism for the event. After this operation, no additional major operations were launched in Iraq until the current umbrella operation plan in action called Operation Claw. It is clear to see with the passing of time, relations between Turkey and local players are eroding further and further. More and more people are starting to consider Turkey’s intervention as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty as they did for Turkey’s intervention in Syria. The players who have taken such a stance involve Iran, who has made strong remarks against Turkey’s intervention. The Iranian envoy to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, said in an interview with Kurdish outlet Rudaw News that “We reject military intervention in Iraq and Turkish forces should not pose a threat or violate Iraqi soil. The security of the Iraqi area should be maintained by Iraqi forces and [Kurdistan] region forces in their area … We do not accept at all – be it Turkey or any other country – to intervene in Iraq militarily or advance or have a military presence in Iraq.” This prompted a response from the Turkish envoy Fatih Yildiz, who commented on Twitter stating “Ambassador of Iran would be the last person to lecture Turkey on respecting the borders of Iraq”. As a result, an Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Turkish foreign ministry over the remarks of Masjedi, to bring into question Iranian hostility.
These events have led people to anticipate a potential complete deterioration of Iran-Turkey diplomatic relations as a continuation of Iran’s disapproval of Turkey intervening in Northern Syria last year in an operation against the Syrian Arab Army called “Operation Spring Shield” – a landmark development for the Syrian Civil War where Turkey claimed to have neutralized over 3000 SAA soldiers and destroyed hundreds of integral pieces of Syrian military vehicles. Some even predict that this may lead to direct military conflict over the supposed desire for both states to dominate Iraq. In reality, the situation is not that ominous at all – Turkey’s relationship with Iran is not such a deep rivalry that it might deteriorate so easily. Turkey and Iran’s view on each other is similar to Turkey and Russia – it’s an up and down relationship, with many instances of confrontation in highly relevant warzones and diplomatic disputes but at the same time, large amounts of direct cooperation and healthy diplomatic ties. The shockingly hostile rhetoric is not a new thing either – this type of enmity has occurred over the same exact situation before in 1997 during Turkey’s operation in Iraqi Kurdistan where Turkey accused Iran of supporting the PKK, and Iran accused Turkey of being in collaboration with Israel. Since then, Turkey and Iran have butted heads numerous times, mainly in Syria with Turkish-backed militias fighting Iranian-backed militias very extensively. If all this has not led to Turkey or Iran going head to head for dominance in Iraq or Syria, then surely this new development will not result in such an outcome either. The most likely result of this new Turkish operation is a small amount of damage to PKK forces in Northern Iraq and then another gap in Iraqi operations on the Turkish side.
Iran
It’s no secret that Iran’s connections and influence over Iraq run very deep, as Iran sees Iraq as a crucial asset to its prosperity, influence and security. Maintaining full and open relations with Iraq means that Iran’s line of alliances stretching from Lebanon across Syria and Iraq all the way to Iran remains stable, The result of this reach is that Iran can not only have access to a massive and potentially prosperous coalition to maintain its interests in the Middle East, but it also means that it has direct access to one of its greatest enemies: Israel. In this way, maintaining political and social control over Iraq is a means of securing a line of defense and offense at the same time. However, not all is going well for Iran’s Iraqi plans. A dynamic is slowly forming that is pitting the common Iraqi people, of all ethnic and religious groups, against what is perceived as a foreign Persian imperial fist. With the Iranian-trained and government sponsored Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq taking the side of the ruling Government and even allegedly using force against some factions of protestors while the Shiite Arabs spearhead the anti-government protests, it is a clear sign that a common religious sect will not be enough to bring the Iranians and Iraqi Arabs together. Many see this as a sign that sectarianism is deteriorating in Iraq and will soon be replaced by a new wave of Arab nationalism, and that Iran’s dominance over Iraq’s political and military affairs may come to see its end. Surely, this sentiment is part of what fuels the protests in the first place. However, it is not that simple.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is a section of Iran’s armed forces, founded shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Its constitutional purpose is to defend Iran’s Islamic Republican political system. It is widely considered to be one of the strongest military establishments on the planet, operating with hundreds of thousands of members and Iran’s very modern domestically produced military technology. Its Quds Force is known for training army divisions and militias in countries where they have political interests, such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The IRGC is referred to as the spine of Iran’s economy and political sphere, having its roots deep in every facet of Iranian society despite having less members than the armed forces itself. In its present form and level of influence, frankly speaking, a country like Iraq today has no hope of pushing its tendrils out. The most effective military entities in Iraq are the ones trained by Iran, and that in itself is very telling. Ever since the original Iran-Iraq war, Iran has solidified itself as a major force to be reckoned with, especially with regards to Iraq. The war taught Iran and the rest of the world a bunch of lessons. Iran was not going to tolerate a security threat from Iraq again, and if Iran can bear the brunt of Iraq’s military force during the inception of its Islamic regime, then it can bear Iraq’s resistance with the might of military and intelligence they have today. On top of that, withdrawing their forces from Iraq means leaving themselves vulnerable and surrounded by US military bases, which is simply not an option for Iran. In events to come, Iraq’s political situation will depend highly on Iran’s own power.
Iran’s future is more volatile and hard to predict than other countries due to the many factors that go into Iran’s development and policy. On one hand, Iran is set to become much stronger than it is now, with a new, less hostile administration in charge of the United States and highly lucrative new military deals with the People’s Republic of China. They developed highly effective technology even under sanctions, so what is stopping them from only going up from here? On the other hand, it is widely known that Iran’s political structure is very volatile – being ruled by clerics who aren’t exactly political geniuses, such that the streets of Iran are frequently filled with protestors who demand economic and legal reforms. Depending on how the Iranian government plays its cards, it could either develop significantly in the decades to become and get much stronger, or it can slowly deteriorate due to pressure from the international community and domestic instability. Iran’s strength in the coming years will surely determine whether it can maintain political influence over Iraq – If it stays as strong as it is now or gets stronger, it will not be possible to loosen Iran’s grip. Contrarily, if it becomes weaker and deteriorates in strength, then the Iraqi people may come to gain enough strength to shove them off, and change the dynamic between the countries of Iraq and Iran. This Iraqi revolution may certainly come from a new wave of Arab nationalism or desire for a more secular democratic political structure. One thing it will not come from is Islamism or sentiments of political Islam, as the Iraqi peoples will collectively try to distance themselves from the likes of ISIS and other such entities. Speaking of which, ISIS is also a relevant stakeholder that will be discussed in the next section.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
Possibly the most notorious terrorist group of the modern day, ISIS is a self proclaimed revival of the traditional Islamic Caliphate with allegiances and branches all over the world. It is known for using brutal terroristic and genocidal tactics against non-Muslims, Shiites, and Muslims who refuse to pledge allegiance to their false caliphate. It is a trauma-inducing name to hear for millions. As the name implies, its main base of operations is situated in Iraq, in the region bordering Syria where it also still maintains control over some pockets of land. The terror group at one point controlled over 100,000 square kilometres of land across Syria and Iraq, not to mention its influence across the globe in places like West Africa, the Congo, Southeast Asia, and scattered allegiances throughout the Middle East. Luckily, in 2014, when ISIS reached its territorial peak, resistance against it became increasingly effective and they started to lose huge swaths of its land to a large variety of groups such as the Syrian Rebels, the Syrian Arab Army, the Iraqi Army, the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq, the YPG (Kurds), the US army, and other assorted groups. Updated information on ISIS’s territorial control is largely unavailable, but with scattered information it can be concluded that ISIS’s remaining territory is very small in Iraq and Syria. They have undoubtedly suffered a large amount of decisive defeats, from losing the major cities of their control such as Mosul and Raqqa to even seeing the death of their supreme leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi during an operation by the US military in October of 2019.
Many people would reasonably predict that this ushers the end of ISIS’s relevance in the Middle East. However, ISIS’s recent development has shown this to not be the case. Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted military operations enough to allow ISIS some time to recover and even expand their influence. They have exploited military gaps left by economic issues that are directly tied to COVID and used it to ramp up their attacks. The first quarter of 2020 featured 566 attacks by ISIS in Iraq alone, and over 100 attacks were reported in August 2020 (constituting a 25% increase from July 2020). Secondly, cracks in the US-Iraqi alliance (see Iraqi vote to expel foreign troops discussed previously) represent the strain of the opposing factions in the coalition that was once so effective against ISIS. This raises concerns that these tensions will enable ISIS to overcome the previously unbearable odds and follow through with a full resurgence. Although the death of Al-Baghdadi is touted as a sign that ISIS’s end is afoot, it could serve to function as the means by which the Coalition makes a fatal mistake and allows the Islamic State’s recovery.
As the past year has proven, ISIS is quite resilient, resilient to the point that even the death of their supreme leader was not enough to decrease the amount of their attacks. They are fully capable and willing to continue their bloody conquest, and their thousands of capable fighters are sure to keep them going for now. The players in Iraq who have worked so hard to push back ISIS must not underestimate ISIS now and let all their work go to waste. It is also worth mentioning that the factors that enable and reward ISIS’s recruitment efforts still trouble not only Iraqi society but all the places where ISIS currently wields influence, and will keep feeding into this issue until it is treated. One of these factors is poverty, as groups connected to ISIS and Al Qaeda may exploit poor, crime ridden communities by offering an extreme alternative and providing for that community better than the government that is supposed to be taking care of them. This is a means of brainwashing young, capable men and women that their extremist ideology is the answer to their woes. With an 11.7% increase in poverty-stricken Iraqi citizens visualized as a result of the combined brutal effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, the price of war and the corruption of the Iraqi government, this factor is sadly sure to be exacerbated in favour of ISIS’s recruitment efforts.
Related to this factor is the other factor of disdain for the government. With political revolution comes many wild cards, it is an opportunity for every political movement to push its limits. Currently in Iraq, strong and defiant protests have persisted across the country, representing over a decade of built up frustration with the ruling political establishment, the foreign players using and abusing Iraq for their interests, and the lack of freedom and representation that binds the Iraqi people like chains. Although it is true that the Iraqi peoples are overwhelmingly done with political Islam and are more likely to go for something like Arab nationalism or liberalism, a combination of ISIS’s reputation/propaganda campaign and the seeming hopelessness of other forms of governance and powers for Iraq will be enough to drive at least a miniscule portion of the population into ISIS’s ranks. With ISIS exacerbating the divide between political Islam and secularism, more and more “moderate islamists” who appear to constitute the middle ground will undoubtedly be pulled in one direction or the other as a grey area becomes less believable in the coming years.
One example worth looking at is Tunisia: its removal of the Ben Ali regime in 2011 kicked off the Arab Spring and represented a new hope for freedom and democracy in the Arab world. However, 10 years later, these factors discussed in the context of Iraq can all apply to Tunisia as even what is touted as an example of a free, liberal Arab nation features a shocking 13% of the population that has a favourable opinion of ISIS. The survey showing this is from 2015 and can be considered slightly outdated in the context of how ISIS’s influence has developed since then. After all, in 2014-2015 ISIS was at its peak and this surely must have inspired some of the support. However, the fact that a country that had just gone through a revolution for democracy and was touted as a liberalizing free Arab country showed such high levels of support for ISIS proves the extent to which factors such as disdain for government and poverty levels have influence on support for even such brutal groups as ISIS. The example of Tunisia is worth bringing up as it views itself in a somewhat similar position to Iraq, which is also protesting and vying for freedom at the moment, and it gives a historical precedent for large scale support for ISIS emerging after anti-government movements.
An alternate perspective is worth bringing up for this matter – although ISIS is almost an irrepressible group, the years of experience battling ISIS by multiple different groups has thwarted the advantage ISIS previously had (surprise). ISIS’s original emergence was one that exploited circumstances rather than just operating off of the toughness of the militia alone, as it took advantage of political instability in both Iraq and Syria and used unique, brutal tactics to secure its dominance in the area it conquered. With all surrounding stakeholders now being fully aware of ISIS’s tactics and the threat it poses, it will have a very hard time returning to the peak territory it previously boasted. Additionally, it can also be argued that the current minor resurgence ISIS is experiencing is also a way that ISIS is taking advantage of circumstance, as the COVID breakout is a key factor to ISIS’s recent offensives. When the pandemic subsides or at least the coalition is better prepared to operate under its presence, ISIS will lose this advantage and once again be vulnerable. The fact of the matter is, there is evidence proving both sides: on one hand, ISIS is certainly committed to their cause and the fact that they haven’t been extinguished yet even under such a massive coalition and continue to expand its influence in other parts of the world is bad news. On the other hand, changing dynamics have put ISIS in a precarious position and the Iraqi peoples may yet have hope to remove ISIS’s destructive power from damaging Iraq’s prosperity. One thing is for sure: ISIS will certainly play a role in Iraq’s future, and all local players must not undermine their previous efforts by underestimating the enemy or dropping their focus.
The United States of America
Foreign policy in the USA is volatile, and the recent replacement of the Trump administration by the Biden administration is an example of that. During Trump’s rule, many major events impacted Iraqi politics. The USA ignored a unanimous Iraqi parliamentary vote to expel foreign troops from the country, Trump commanded the assassination of Iran’s top general Qassem Soleimani, ISIS’s caliph was exterminated in Syria and the US government aided in what has been dubbed the greatest military operation since America’s own 2003 invasion (this operation would be none other than the Battle of Mosul, where the city of Mosul was liberated from ISIS control in large part due to the efforts of local Iraqi forces). Despite all this action, the Trump administration seemed to assume a cocky attitude after accomplishing the undeniably remarkable feat of terminating ISIS’s notorious caliph. Trump’s announcement referring to Baghdadi’s followers as frightened, lost puppies seems like wishful thinking and blatant rhetoric in retrospect, considering what ISIS has done in the meantime.
The new Biden administration will not maintain the same attitude displayed by Donald Trump it appears, as Biden promised in his first days in office that he would pledge military support to all his allies abroad and would not let ISIS regroup. But we must not forget Biden’s dark history with Iraq – the fact that he voted positively to authorize the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It was a big point of criticism during the democratic primaries in the US, and rightfully represents an inexcusable tarnish on his record. The Iraqi peoples would (and should) be hard-pressed to accept Biden’s interference with open arms with this fact in mind. This relationship will surely affect the US’s relations with the Iraqi government and people in the years to come as it has pledged to remain highly present on Iraqi soil. Biden’s first military action in the form of airstrikes on Iranian backed militias in Syria in late February were not far off from his January 20th inauguration, and potentially represent an even more interventionist attitude than the Trump administration demonstrated. At this point, only time will tell.
Conclusion
After 18 years since the American invasion of Iraq, the massive change that has been ravaging Iraq for the past few decades is clearly not ready to subside yet – many major events are in store for Iraq’s future. If historical Turkish foreign policy and general Turkish interests are any indication, Turkey’s involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan will largely be minimal and inconsequential, despite what many may think. Dissatisfaction with Iraq’s reigning political system is at an all time high for the past decade, and is sure to cause more turmoil as protests continue throughout 2021. Relations between the members of the coalition that drove back ISIS are straining more and more every year, as Iraqis gain more disdain for American and Iranian influence and the Iranian and American rivalry persists. It is crucial that members of the coalition remain intent and focussed on finishing the job against ISIS so that the cunning terror group does not exploit gaps and circumstances to facilitate their resurgence. Unfortunately when conducting geopolitical analysis, people tend to lose sight of the more important things – whilst all these big local stakeholders continue to fight out their problems, the Iraqi peoples are suffering by the millions. Luckily, with the increase of humanitarian aid in the region and a relative uptick in stability, many Iraqis have seen reprieve: however, there is still a very long way to go. As previously mentioned, the COVID outbreak is set to increase Iraq’s poverty rate to 31.7%, adding an 11.7% increase from 2018. Most of these poverty stricken individuals will sadly be children. It is evident that the COVID outbreak has significantly exacerbated what was already one of the worst humanitarian crises in the word. Please consider contributing to Humanitarian Aid by working with one of the following charities or at least spreading awareness of the humanitarian crisis:
https://www.islamicreliefcanada.org/about/locations/iraq/
https://www.savethechildren.org/us/where-we-work/iraq
https://www.unicef.org/appeals/iraq
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Reining in Iraq’s Paramilitaries Will Just Make Them Stronger
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html
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